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PRODUCT SUITABILITY, DUE DILIGENCE AND 
MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY 
The New Regime of Regulation 18B of the  
Financial Advisers Regulations 
In response to the structured products crisis of 2008, many 
changes were made to the Singapore regulatory landscape over 
the past three years. More recently, in July 2011, the Financial 
Advisers Regulations (Cap 110, Rg 2, 2004 Rev Ed) were 
amended and an important new provision – reg 18B – was 
added. Regulation 18B requires a financial adviser and its 
senior management to conduct a comprehensive due diligence 
exercise before selling a new product. This comment considers 
reg 18B’s overall scheme, its interpretational difficulties, the 
demands of the diligence requirements, its interrelation with 
s 27 of the Financial Advisers Act (Cap 110, 2007 Rev Ed) and 
the extent to which the regulatory regime has been altered. 
LOW Kee Yang* 
LLB (National University of Singapore),  
LLM, PhD (King’s College London);  
Associate Professor of Law, Singapore Management University. 
I. Introduction 
1 It was not so long ago that the global financial crisis triggered by 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers rocked the world. In Singapore, the 
structured products saga involving Lehman Minibonds, DBS High 
Notes and other derivative instruments brought substantial losses to 
more than 10,000 investors. The ensuing period witnessed an array  
of actions and responses by the Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(“MAS”), some involving the participation of industry stakeholders. 
The developments resulted in significant changes to the regulatory 
landscape, the foremost of which were: 
(a) the extension in April 2009 of the Consumer Protection 
(Fair Trading Act)1 regime to financial products; 
                                                                       
* The author benefited from discussions with Christopher Chen, Tan Sin Liang and 
Andrew White. 
1 Cap 52A, 2009 Rev Ed. 
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(b) the issuance in April 2009 by MAS of the Guidelines on 
Fair Dealing2 (“FDG”); 
(c) the issuance in October 2010 by MAS of the Guidelines 
on the Product Highlights Sheet;3 
(d) the issuance in November 2010 by MAS of various new 
or revised notices and guidelines on miscellaneous matters; 
(e) the July 2011 amendments to the Financial Advisers 
Regulations4 (“FAR”) in July 2011; and 
(f) the issuance in July 2011 by MAS of a revised Notice on 
Recommendations on Investment Products and a Notice on the 
Sale of Investment Products.5 
2 Regulation 18B of the FAR, the focus6 of our attention, was 
introduced against the backdrop of all these changes made to enhance 
due diligence by financial advisers and the protection of investors. 
3 As a side note, it is observed that the new measure – the essence 
of which is to require enhanced due diligence for new financial products – 
was introduced by way of a provision in a piece of subsidiary legislation 
(the FAR) rather than through an amendment to the Financial Advisers 
Act7 (“FAA”) itself, such as by amending s 27 – which basically requires a 
financial adviser to have a reasonable basis for making recommendations 
as to financial products – or adding a s 27A. Neither was it encapsulated 
in an MAS Notice (which curiously is supposed to have statutory 
force),8 guideline or some other circular. 
                                                                       
2 Guideline No FAA-G11, issued on 3 April 2009. 
3 Guideline No SFA 13-G10, issued on 21 October 2010. 
4 Cap 110, Rg 2, 2004 Rev Ed. Financial Advisers (Amendment) Regulations 2011 
(GN No S 433/2011). 
5 Notice No FAA-N16, issued on 28 July 2011 and Notice No SFA 04-N12, issued on 
28 July 2011, both of which took effect on 1 January 2012. 
6 Apart from reg 18B, the Financial Advisers (Amendment) Regulations 2011  
(GN No S 433/2011) also added a para 8A to reg 31 of the Financial Advisers 
Regulations (Cap 110, Rg 2, 2004 Rev Ed) to address introduction activities by 
bank tellers. 
7 Cap 110, 2007 Rev Ed. 
8 Monetary Authority of Singapore (“MAS”) notices are issued pursuant to s 58 of 
the Financial Advisers Act (Cap 110, 2007 Rev Ed), which empowers MAS to issue 
written directions. Although s 58(3), like s 64(7) (which empowers MAS to issue 
codes, guidelines, policy statements, etc), says that any written direction so issued is 
“deemed not to be subsidiary legislation”, s 58(5) declares that any person who fails 
to comply with a requirement specified in a written direction is guilty of an 
offence. Indeed, notices issued by MAS routinely contain a boxed note drawing 
specific attention to s 58(5). The crux of the matter is simple: if a written direction 
or notice is not subsidiary legislation, how could a breach or non-compliance of it 
be an offence? 
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II. Regulation 18B 
A. Overall scheme of reg 18B 
4 The intent of reg 18B is clear enough – financial advisers should 
do due diligence before selling new products. The overall scheme is as 
follows: 
(a) a financial adviser must do due diligence to ascertain 
suitability before allowing a new product to be sold: reg 18B(1); 
(b) the requisite due diligence exercise includes product 
due diligence, client due diligence and other aspects of the 
overall system to support the sale of the product: reg 18B(2); 
(c) the due diligence exercise requires the personal attention 
of every member of the financial adviser’s senior management: 
reg 18B(3); 
(d) delegation of the due diligence tasks is permitted but 
with qualifications: reg 18B(4); 
(e) a financial adviser must not sell a new product which 
the due diligence exercise indicates is not suitable: reg 18B(8); 
and 
(f) the contravention of reg 18B without reasonable excuse 
is an offence: 18B(10). 
B. Due diligence prerequisite 
5 The basic prerequisite is set out in ostensibly simple and clear 
terms in reg 18B(1): 
Before selling or marketing any new product in Singapore to any 
targeted client, a financial adviser shall carry out a due diligence 
exercise to ascertain whether the new product is suitable for the 
targeted client. 
6 The provision, it seems, desires financial advisers to sell 
products that are suitable to its clients and to conduct due diligence to 
ascertain suitability. The notions of suitability and due diligence are 
reinforced by reg 18B(8), which provides: 
For the avoidance of doubt, no financial adviser shall sell or market 
any new product to any targeted client if the due diligence exercise 
required to be and carried out under paragraph (1) indicates that the 
new product is not suitable for the targeted client. 
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So if the due diligence exercise results in the financial adviser finding the 
product unsuitable, the financial adviser must not sell or market the 
product. 
7 Let us take a closer look at some of the terms used in the above 
provisions. 
C. “New product” 
8 Firstly, “new product” is defined as any investment product9 that 
“has not previously been sold or marketed” by the financial adviser or 
any of its representatives. Regulation 18B therefore does not apply to 
existing products, that is, products which at the coming into force of the 
provision (ie, 28 July 2011)10 were already being sold or marketed by the 
financial adviser or any of its representatives. One consequence of  
this definition is that existing products are unaffected by the new due 
diligence requirements even if the products had never been assessed and 
approved by the senior management of the financial adviser; reg 18B is 
forward looking, and presumably it was considered too much of an 
imposition to require enhanced due diligence for existing products.11 It 
should be noted that “new product” is defined to include a product 
which “varies in any manner (other than in respect of the maturity 
date)” from any existing product. 
9 A second consequence, probably unintended, is that technically 
speaking a product may be new in that it had not been sold or marketed 
before 28 July 2011 but once it is sold or marketed at any time thereafter, 
even if that were done without complying with the new due diligence 
requirements, it is not a new product within the meaning of reg 18B. 
The first instance of selling or marketing the product is an offence but 
the subsequent instances do not appear to be.12 A formulation which 
would have avoided the anomaly is one which provides that the 
enhanced due diligence is required for “any product” rather than “any 
new product”, and to add the qualification that reg 18B does not apply 
to products that have been sold or marketed by the financial adviser or 
any of its representatives before 28 July 2011. 
                                                                       
9 Other than foreign exchange contracts, futures contracts and securities traded on a 
securities exchange: reg 18B(9). 
10 Financial Advisers Regulations (Cap 110, Rg 2, 2004 Rev Ed) reg 18B(1). 
11 But note that para 2.2.1 of the Monetary Authority of Singapore Guidelines on  
Fair Dealing (Guideline No FAA-G11, issued on 3 April 2009) already required 
financial advisers to do product assessment and market segmentation. 
12 Although, again, there may be an infringement of the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore Guidelines on Fair Dealing (Guideline No FAA-G11, issued on 3 April 
2009). 
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D. “Targeted client” 
10 Regulation 18B(9) defines “targeted client” as “any client … to 
whom the financial adviser intends to sell or market the new product” 
but excludes from its ambit the accredited investor, the expert investor 
and the institutional investor13 – categories of investors who are 
regarded (although the point is debatable) as being able to look after 
their own interests. 
11 It should be noted that the term repeatedly used in reg 18B is 
“targeted client” and not “targeted client segment” which raises the 
vexed question of whether the financial adviser is liable for due diligence 
in respect of the particular sale to an individual client, an issue which 
will be taken up later in this comment. 
E. Details of due diligence requirement 
12 Regulation 18B elaborates upon the due diligence exercise 
required by reg 18B(1) and recites that it includes an assessment of a 
whole spectrum of matters: 
(a) the type of targeted client the new product is suitable 
for and whether the product matches the client base of the 
financial adviser;14 
(b) product details: investment objectives,15 key risks16 and 
costs and fees;17 
(c) processes in place for a representative to determine 
whether the product is suitable for the targeted client;18 
(d) how the product is to be marketed or sold19 and 
whether additional measures are necessary to mitigate any 
conflict of interest between the representative and the client;20 
                                                                       
13 The Financial Advisers Regulations (Cap 110, Rg 2, 2004 Rev Ed) (see reg 2) adopts 
the definitions of these terms in s 4A(1) of the Securities and Futures Act (Cap 289, 
2006 Rev Ed). 
14 Financial Advisers Regulations (Cap 110, Rg 2, 2004 Rev Ed) reg 18B(2)(a). 
15 Financial Advisers Regulations (Cap 110, Rg 2, 2004 Rev Ed) reg 18B(2)(b). 
16 Financial Advisers Regulations (Cap 110, Rg 2, 2004 Rev Ed) reg 18B(2)(c). The 
term is defined in reg 18B(9) to include market risk, liquidity risk and product-
specific risk. 
17 Financial Advisers Regulations (Cap 110, Rg 2, 2004 Rev Ed) Reg 18B(2)(d). 
18 Financial Advisers Regulations (Cap 110, Rg 2, 2004 Rev Ed) Reg 18B(2)(e). 
19 Financial Advisers Regulations (Cap 110, Rg 2, 2004 Rev Ed) Reg 18B(2)(f). 
20 Financial Advisers Regulations (Cap 110, Rg 2, 2004 Rev Ed) Reg 18B(2)(g). 
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(e) qualifications and training required for a representative;21 
and 
(f) whether the current systems of the financial adviser 
support the sale of the new product to the client.22 
13 Broadly speaking, the due diligence matters fall into three 
categories. 
14 The first is product due diligence, which involves product 
assessment23 and market segmentation.24 Paragraph 2.2.1 of the FDG 
sets it out more clearly: 
The financial institution should undertake formal due diligence on 
any investment product it intends to distribute, in order to: (a) assess 
and fully understand the features and risk-reward characteristics of 
the product; and (b) identify customer segments for which the 
product is suitable, and customer segments for which the product is 
clearly not suitable.[25] 
15 It is significant that with reg 18B, there is now a statutory 
requirement of product due diligence, which hitherto was only required 
by the FDG. 
16 The second is client due diligence, often referred to as the 
“KYC” (know your client) process conducted by representatives to 
ascertain the client’s background so as to enable the representative to 
recommend a suitable product.26 
17 The third category concerns a wide variety of matters which fall 
within the expression in reg 18B(2)(i) – “whether the current systems of 
the financial adviser adequately support the sale of the product”. Whilst 
the words “adequately support” may be rather vague, one should be 
mindful of the regulator’s expectation, enunciated in the FDG, that 
                                                                       
21 Financial Advisers Regulations (Cap 110, Rg 2, 2004 Rev Ed) Reg18B(2)(h). 
22 Financial Advisers Regulations (Cap 110, Rg 2, 2004 Rev Ed) Reg 18B(2)(i). 
23 Financial Advisers Regulations (Cap 110, Rg 2, 2004 Rev Ed) reg 18B(2)(b), (c)  
and (d). 
24 Financial Advisers Regulations (Cap 110, Rg 2, 2004 Rev Ed) reg 18B(2)(a). 
25 Observe that the Monetary Authority of Singapore Guidelines on Fair Dealing 
(Guideline No FAA-G11, issued on 3 April 2009) provision requires the financial 
adviser to identify not just suitable customer segments but also unsuitable 
customer segments. 
26 Note that with effect from 1 January 2012, the client due diligence exercise must 
include an assessment of the investment knowledge and experience of the client: 
see Monetary Authority of Singapore Notice on Recommendations on Investment 
Products (Notice No FAA-N16, issued on 28 July 2011) and Monetary Authority of 
Singapore Notice on the Sale of Investment Products (Notice No SFA 04-N12, 
issued on 28 July 2011). 
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board and senior management should deliver fair dealing outcomes to 
its customers. Of particular relevance are Outcome 2 (offering products 
and services suitable to target customer segments) and Outcome 3 
(competent representatives who provide customers with quality advice 
and appropriate recommendations). 
18 In summary, reg 18B(1) requires a financial adviser to perform 
three categories of due diligence – product due diligence, client due 
diligence and (overall) systems due diligence. 
F. Management responsibility for due diligence 
19 The due diligence requirement outlined above is a demanding 
one, and the burden is placed specifically on the senior management of 
the financial institution. Regulation 18B(3) states it in onerous terms: 
No financial adviser shall sell or market any new product to any 
targeted client unless every member of the senior management … – 
(a) personally satisfied himself that the new product is suitable for the 
targeted client; and (b) personally approved the sale or marketing of 
the new product to the targeted client [emphasis added]. 
20 Two things are noteworthy here. The first is that, unlike the 
conduct of business provisions of the FAA, such as s 25 or s 27, where 
the legislation is content just to prescribe and proscribe conduct in 
relation to the financial adviser generally, reg 18B(3) specifies the 
persons within the institution who are responsible for compliance. It 
states in no uncertain terms that the due diligence requirement is the 
responsibility of every member of senior management – that is, every 
executive director.27 
21 Secondly, the expectation is set remarkably high – every 
executive director must, on the basis of the due diligence exercise, be 
personally satisfied as to the suitability of the new product and must 
personally approve the sale or marketing of the product. A reader’s 
instinctive response would be: how is such personal fulfilment of due 
diligence practical or even possible? The answer depends on what the 
due diligence exercise entails. 
                                                                       
27 Regulation 18B(9) of the Financial Advisers Regulations (Cap 110, Rg 2, 2004 Rev Ed) 
defines “member of senior management” as “any person for the time being holding 
the office of chief executive officer or executive director of the financial adviser, 
including any person carrying out the duties of any such office if the office is 
vacant”. A similar (but more succinct) definition is used in the Monetary Authority 
of Singapore Notice on Recommendations on Investment Products (Notice 
No FAA-N16, issued on 28 July 2011). 
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22 As discussed above, the due diligence exercise comprises 
product due diligence, client due diligence and systems due diligence. As 
regards product due diligence (regs 18B(2)(a)–18B(2)(d)), it is clear 
that the regulation expects every executive director to be involved in the 
assessment of every new product, to understand it and to decide 
whether to give his approval. The exercise involves an actual appraisal of 
the new product. As reg 18B(2) moves to the matter of client due 
diligence, we see the wording has changed, and the provision requires 
executive directors to assess “the processes in place” for the 
representative to determine whether a product is suitable for the client. 
The impression one gets is that, here, the executive directors’ 
responsibility is to assess the robustness of the KYC process or system; it 
does not extend to assessing product suitability to each individual client. 
Finally, as regards the third aspect of the due diligence exercise – 
whether the overall system adequately supports the sale of the new 
product – it is quite clear what reg 18B requires is that the executive 
directors assess the robustness of the system. 
23 On the above interpretation, reg 18B requires executive 
directors to assess each new product but as regards all other aspects, 
including client due diligence, what it requires is that they assess the 
adequacy and robustness of the system. On a practical basis, this 
requisite due diligence can be carried out at a board meeting where 
a team of individuals, such as the head of products, the chief risks 
officer and the head of compliance, makes a presentation on the new 
product and on all aspects of the overall support system. As regards the 
product, all executive directors are expected to participate in the actual 
assessment of the product and its segmentation; as regards all other 
aspects, they are only expected to assess the robustness of the system. 
Such a paradigm of due diligence appears fair, reasonable and workable. 
G. Delegation by senior management 
24 Can senior management delegate its duty to conduct due 
diligence? Regulation 18B(4) gives a qualified answer, for it allows senior 
management, acting with unanimous consent,28 to designate a person or 
a committee of persons (such person or persons not being part of senior 
management)29 to personally carry out the requirements of satisfaction 
                                                                       
28 Where consent is not unanimous, the executive directors who consented to the 
delegation are guilty of an offence: Financial Advisers Regulations (Cap 110, Rg 2, 
2004 Rev Ed) reg 18B(6). It thus behooves consenting directors to ensure that all 
other directors also agree to the delegation. 
29 This restriction is a curious one. Considering the gravity of the task, could it not be 
appropriate or desirable to allow a board to decide that an executive director be 
tasked with the responsibility either singly or as the leader of a committee of 
persons? 
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and approval. However, the provision goes on to say that every executive 
director “shall ensure that the designated person or every member of the 
designated committee … fulfills those requirements”. The instinctive 
question is: as a matter of practicability, how could every executive 
director possibly ensure the designated person or committee fulfills the 
requirements? The answer has to be that he cannot. Whilst he can take 
reasonable steps to ensure fulfilment, he cannot ensure fulfilment. It 
would appear that the intention behind reg 18B(4) is that the task can 
be delegated but the responsibility and the liability remain. Such a 
stance is reminiscent of the regulatory philosophy reflected in several 
statements contained in the MAS Guidelines on Risk Management 
Practices for Board of Directors and Senior Management, such as:30 
… the Board should consider carefully the extent and nature of 
demands that will be placed on it and identify areas that could 
appropriately be addressed by Board committees. Such committees 
can handle matters requiring detailed review and in-depth consideration. 
However, the Board should recognise that no delegation is absolute 
[emphasis added]. 
While senior management might typically delegate some of its risk 
management to other committees or personnel, its accountability 
cannot be delegated [emphasis added]. 
It seems the liability of every executive director to ensure due diligence 
is absolute. 
25 Such a stance contrasts sharply with the position under 
company law where directors, if authorised by the articles of association, 
may delegate their powers and if such delegation is done with 
reasonable belief that the delegatee will competently discharge his duties 
in the company’s interests, the directors will not be in breach.31 The 
common law position is reinforced by s 157C of the Companies Act,32 
which allows a director to rely on reports and other information given 
by an employee, a professional adviser or a designated director or 
committee of directors so long as the former acts in good faith, makes 
proper inquiry where needed and has no knowledge that such reliance is 
unwarranted. 
26 It is observed that reg 18B(10) affords the financial adviser a 
defence of “reasonable excuse”. In contrast, reg 18B(5) deems a failure by 
an executive director to fulfill his duty of due diligence under reg 18B a 
failure by him to discharge the duties and functions of his office under 
                                                                       
30 Issued in February 2006, at paras 1.2.3 and 2.7 respectively. 
31 See, eg, Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore vol 6 (Company Law) (LexisNexis,  
2010 Reissue) at para 70.262. 
32 Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed. 
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s 57(1)(c) of the FAA, but makes no mention of “reasonable excuse”. The 
question then is whether two provisions of the FAA may be of 
application and assistance here. The first is s 57(1)(b), which provides 
that if MAS is satisfied, inter alia, that an officer (of the financial 
adviser) “has, without reasonable excuse, failed to secure compliance” 
with the FAA, it may, if it thinks it necessary in the public interest or for 
the protection of investors, direct the financial adviser to remove that 
officer from its employment. But it might be argued that the provision is 
inapplicable on two grounds, the first being that technically it concerns 
the compliance of the FAA and not the FAR, and the second being that 
it deals with the subject of the regulatory sanction of the removal of an 
officer. The second provision is s 84(1) of the FAA, which provides: 
Any officer of a licensed financial adviser who fails to take all 
reasonable steps to secure – 
(a) compliance with any provision of this Act … 
… 
shall be guilty of an offence … 
27 A similar objection can be made that s 84(1) is concerned with a 
breach of the FAA and not a breach of the FAR. The counterargument 
would be that technical niceties aside, s 57(1) and s 84(1) provide strong 
indication of the legislative intent that directors and officers who act 
reasonably should not be held liable for infractions relating to financial 
products. On this rationalisation, it may be contended that like the 
financial adviser, executive directors who have reasonable excuse will 
also not be guilty of contravening reg 18B. The actual legal position on 
this point is far from clear. 
28 Of course, how a court would interpret the term “reasonable 
excuse” is another question altogether and no doubt the fact that the 
liability of executive directors under regs 18B(3) and 18B (4) appears to 
be absolute poses significant difficulty. And the question is linked to the 
next question. 
H. Due diligence – Objective or subjective requirement? 
29 Regulation 18B requires a financial adviser and its senior 
management to conduct due diligence before selling new products. The 
question arises: does a financial adviser comply with reg 18B so long as a 
due diligence exercise is carried out or does the exercise have to meet a 
minimum or acceptable threshold? Put another way: is the requisite 
standard of diligence subjective or objective? There are two indications 
from reg 18B itself. The first is that the term “due diligence” has  
the inherent meaning of diligence that is due or, to express more 
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expansively, to take such measures and precautions as are appropriate, 
having regard to the objective of protecting investors or, to borrow from 
the FDG, ensuring fair dealing outcomes. The second is the implication 
drawn from reg 18B(8), which refers to “the due diligence exercise 
required to be and carried out” [emphasis added]. Further, when 
considered against the backdrop of the complete regulatory framework 
and especially the paramount criterion of a “fit and proper person”,33 
who is expected to comply with all regulatory provisions, including 
notices, guidelines and all other circulars and notes, it is clear that all 
financial advisers must abide by an objective standard which is heavily 
influenced or guided by regulatory expectations. 
30 The short answer, therefore, is that reg 18B probably requires 
financial advisers to abide by a high, objective standard of due diligence. 
I. Does management responsibility extend to client due 
diligence? 
31 Perhaps the most vexed interpretational difficulty with reg 18B 
is whether the responsibility of senior management extends to the actual 
client due diligence exercise. There are several reasons for the view that 
it does. 
32 Let us look at the provisions again. Regulation 18B(1) says that 
before selling a new product to a targeted client, a financial adviser has 
to carry out a due diligence exercise to “ascertain whether the new 
product is suitable for the targeted client”. As noted earlier, the words 
used are “targeted client” and not “targeted client segment”. The obvious 
argument is that the word segment would have been used if that was the 
intention, as was done in Outcome 2 of the FDG (“[f]inancial 
institutions offer products and services that are suitable for their target 
customer segments”) and para 2.2.1 of the FDG, which expressly says 
that financial institutions “should undertake formal due diligence on 
any investment product … in order to identify customer segments”. 
33 Likewise, the plain reading of reg 18B(3) appears to reinforce 
this view as it provides that every member of senior management must 
personally satisfy himself that the new product is suitable for the 
                                                                       
33 Financial advisers and their representatives must be “fit and proper” persons:  
see s 9(1)(m)(i) and s 23(1)(g)(ii) of the Financial Advisers Act (Cap 110,  
2007 Rev Ed). The Monetary Authority of Singapore Guidelines on Fit and Proper 
Criteria (Guideline No FSG-G0) lay down the expectations of competence, 
honesty, integrity and financial soundness, and provide elaboration on these 
attributes. 
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targeted client and must personally approve the sale of the product to 
the targeted client. There is further support from reg 18B(8) which says: 
[N]o financial adviser shall sell or market any new product to any 
targeted client if the due diligence exercise required to be and carried 
out … indicates that the new product is not suitable for the targeted 
client. [emphasis added] 
34 Bear in mind also the regulatory stance, as stated in para 3.2.1 
of the FDG that financial institutions “should ensure that all 
representatives have the knowledge and skills to provide quality advice  
to customers …” [emphasis added] and in para 3.2.4 of the same that 
financial institutions “should have a zero tolerance policy for failures by 
representatives to follow prescribed advisory and sales process”. Holding 
senior management liable for client due diligence, a vital part of investor 
protection, is in keeping with this stance of absolute liability. 
35 But there are also credible arguments for the stand that 
management responsibility does not extend to actual client due diligence. 
The strongest of these is the logical interpretation of reg 18B(2). It is 
clear from reading the provision that as regards product due diligence 
(items (a) to (d) of reg 18B(2)), senior management is required to assess 
the actual details of the product and to decide on the category of client 
for which it is suitable whereas as regards client due diligence, what is 
required is an assessment of “the processes” by which a representative 
determines the suitability of the product to the targeted client and  
not the actual determination itself.34 The insertion of the words  
“the processes” leads to an almost irresistible inference that senior 
management need not assess actual client due diligence. 
36 Further, it can be argued that it is practically impossible for 
every member of senior management to ensure that the client due 
diligence is properly carried out. The retort to this is that it is equally 
impracticable, where there is delegation under reg 18B(4), for every 
member of senior management to “ensure” that a designated person or 
committee fulfills the due diligence requirements; yet such liability is 
imposed on each of them. 
37 There is genuine doubt as to which of the two positions is 
correct. On balance, this author’s view is that the latter position appears 
more persuasive. 
                                                                       
34 But note that reg 18B of the Financial Advisers Regulations (Cap 110, Rg 2,  
2004 Rev Ed) says that the due diligence exercise “includes” an assessment of the 
processes; it may be argued that the exercise could extend to the actual client due 
diligence itself. 
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J. Other questions and doubts 
38 There are other problems in interpreting and applying reg 18B. 
39 Firstly, when the executive directors meet to assess and approve 
new products, what degree of agreement is required? Must the decision 
be unanimous? The reason why such a thought even arises is because a 
board decision to delegate the due diligence task requires unanimity, 
and in the event the decision is not unanimous, the consenting directors 
are in breach of their duty as director. The severity of the law towards 
the issue of delegation leads one to wonder whether a simple majority is 
sufficient for a decision to approve a new product. 
40 Secondly, one wonders about the role of non-executive directors 
in the assessment and approval of new products. It would be 
extraordinary if non-executive directors were to be excluded from such 
important meetings. Since non-executive directors provide a degree of 
neutrality and balance, it seems desirable, even imperative, that they be 
present and vote at such meetings. So far as the decision to delegate the 
due diligence exercise is concerned, it would appear that, technically, the 
decision would be unanimous if all executive directors agree, even if one 
or more non-executive directors disagree. 
41 Thirdly, does reg 18B require a financial adviser to ensure that 
the products that it sells are suitable to the clients? If so, it certainly goes 
further than s 27 of the FAA, which only requires the financial adviser  
to have a reasonable basis for recommending products. The general 
tenor of reg 18B is consistent with s 27, as it requires financial advisers 
to carry out due diligence to ascertain suitability but stops short of 
requiring financial advisers to ensure suitability. An important 
qualification, however, is that where the financial adviser’s due diligence 
exercise indicates that a product is unsuitable for the targeted client, it is 
clear from reg 18B(8) that the product must not be sold. This leads us to 
the next area of interest – a comparison of reg 18B with s 27 of the FAA. 
III. Regulation 18B and s 27 FAA compared 
42 There are similarities and differences between the two provisions. 
43 Section 27(1) prohibits a financial adviser from making a 
recommendation on a product unless it has a reasonable basis for 
making that recommendation. Regulation 18B(1) says that a financial 
adviser should not sell a product unless it has conducted a due diligence 
exercise to ascertain its suitability to the client. In substance the essence 
of the two provisions is similar – a financial adviser must take 
reasonable steps to ascertain that a product is suitable for its client. 
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Reasonable basis for recommendation equates with due diligence to 
ascertain product suitability. 
44 Section 27(2) explains that a financial adviser has such 
reasonable basis if he had gathered information on the client, made 
investigations as to the product and based on the information and 
investigations he had ascertained that the product is appropriate for the 
client. Essentially, the financial adviser must, having done client due 
diligence and product due diligence, come to a conclusion that the 
product is suitable for the client. Again this is similar to reg 18B(2), 
which requires client due diligence (reg 18B(e)) and product due 
diligence (regs 18B(2)(a)–18B(2)(d)) and through the process arrival at 
the conclusion that the product is suitable (regs 18B(3) and 18B(8)). 
The differences here are that reg 18B appears to address the assessment 
of the client due diligence process rather than the actual process itself 
(as discussed earlier) and that reg 18B is much more specific as regards 
the product due diligence process. Another difference is that reg 18B 
makes reference, additionally, to general systems due diligence. 
45 Yet another important difference, alluded to earlier, is that 
reg 18B specifically identifies the executive directors as the persons upon 
whom the due diligence burdens fall and the regulation apparently 
imposes personal and absolute liability on each executive director. 
46 So while the overall intent is similar and the two provisions 
overlap substantially, there are significant differences within their 
respective regimes. The challenge for financial advisers is to work out a 
practical framework that complies with both regimes.35 
IV. Offences and offenders 
47 Regulation 18B, which at first glance seems relatively 
straightforward, thus in fact comprises a spectrum of scenarios of 
offences and offenders:36 
(a) no due diligence exercise is conducted – the financial 
adviser breaches regs 18B(1) and 18B(3); it would appear that 
the executive directors are not guilty of any breach; 
                                                                       
35 As well as other provisions, such as the Monetary Authority of Singapore Notice on 
Recommendations on Investment Products (Notice No FAA-N16, issued on 
28 July 2011), and the Monetary Authority of Singapore Guidelines on Fair Dealing 
(Guideline No FAA-G11, issued on 3 April 2009). 
36 In addition to these, there is also an offence by the financial adviser if records of the 
due diligence exercise are not kept as required by reg 18B(7) of the Financial 
Advisers Regulations (Cap 110, Rg 2, 2004 Rev Ed). 
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(b) the due diligence exercise indicates that product is not 
suitable and yet product is sold – the financial adviser breaches 
regs 18B(3) and 18B(8); the executive directors breach reg 18B(5); 
(c) the due diligence exercise indicates product is suitable, 
but product is in fact unsuitable – if the standard of due 
diligence required is an objective one and the financial adviser’s 
due diligence exercise falls below that standard, then the 
financial adviser breaches reg 18B(1) and reg 18B(3); the 
executive directors are probably not in breach; 
(d) the due diligence exercise is conducted, but not all 
executive directors approved of the sale – the financial adviser 
breaches reg 18B(3); the culpable directors breach reg 18B(3) 
(read with reg 18B(5)); 
(e) due diligence was done through delegation but: 
(i) the delegation was not done with unanimous 
consent – the financial adviser is not in breach;37 the 
consenting executive directors breach reg 18B(6); 
(ii) not all members gave personal attention to 
ensure that the delegate fulfilled the requirements – the 
financial adviser is implicitly in breach of reg 18B(4) 
(read with reg 18B(3); the culpable executive directors 
are in breach of reg 18B(4) (read with reg 18B(5)); 
(iii) due diligence exercise indicates product is not 
suitable (same as in (b) above); and 
(iv) due diligence exercise indicates product is 
suitable when in fact it is not suitable (same as in  
limb (c) above). 
48 Note, however, that the financial adviser is not guilty if it  
had reasonable excuse (reg 18B(10)) whereas, as discussed earlier, it is 
uncertain whether such a defence avails the executive directors. 
V. Conclusion 
49 It would be accurate to say that the requirement of product due 
diligence is actually not new. In fact, it was alluded to in s 27(2)(a) of 
                                                                       
37 Unless the financial adviser may be regarded as having committed the offence 
through, inter alia, the attribution approach (ascertaining the “directing mind and 
will” of the corporate institution) or through vicarious liability. A very good 
summary of the legal issues in this area is found in S Yeo, N Morgan & Chan W C, 
Criminal Law in Malaysia and Singapore (LexisNexis, 2007) at paras 37.5 ff. 
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the FAA in the first place, albeit in vague and general terms. Also, with 
the issuance of the FDG in 2009, product assessment and market 
segmentation became regulatory mandated. However, reg 18B is 
significant as it gives focus and specificity to the need for due diligence. 
Regulation 18B contains an express legal requirement for financial 
advisers to conduct comprehensive due diligence before selling new 
products and it places the responsibility and liability squarely on the 
shoulders of all the executive directors of the financial adviser. 
50 As with legislative amendments in general, the new regulation 
comes with a fair share of interpretational difficulties, not the least of 
which is whether executive directors bear absolute liability for actual 
client due diligence. Also, one wonders if the logistical and legal burden 
of due diligence placed on executive directors is not an unduly heavy 
one. It is debatable whether the intended changes have been brought 
about with sufficient clarity and whether the new regime which reg 18B 
ushers in will enhance the regulation of financial advisers in a way that 
is workable, effective and fair. Perhaps in the ebb and flow of financial 
regulation, the tide of compliance expected of financial advisers has 
reached a high point. 
 
